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 'Abraham Adamson, owner of A&A Motor Spares in Athlone, Cape Town, was dealing with a client in June 1991 
when the sheriff of the court walked in and seized 21 gearboxes and various other movable assets. 
 His [Adamson's] crime was failing to pay two of his 14 employees the overtime rates stipulated by an industrial 
council which a few weeks earlier he never even knew existed. 1 
So begins one of numerous press reports in the last few years recording the burdens placed 
on small entrepreneurs by legal regulation in general and industrial councils in particular.  A 
senior manager of the Small Business Development Corporation (SBDC) was reported as 
saying that 'he is aware of 10 cases in the Western Cape where businesses were liquidated 
by industrial councils over the last two years, generally for non-payment of levies'. 
Two comments by small employers, quoted in the same report, pithily express their 
viewpoint: 
 'Either I pay them [workers] below the minimum wage or I close my doors and they lose their jobs.  They 
prefer to have their jobs.' 
 'They want to tell me when I can open and close my factory at Christmas.  These people are killing 
employment.  If I comply with these rules I will have to close down my company.' 
A fortnight later the same newspaper published a response by David Levy, general secretary 
of the National Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industries 
who said: 
 'We are not attempting to harm small business in any way.  The industrial councils are essential if we are to 
have civilised working conditions and a decent standard of living for employees, whether they come from big or 
small businesses.  [Opponents of the system] are often businesses with a record of exploitation 2 
This exchange sums up two opposing points of view in a debate that has been surfacing 
with increasing frequency in the recent period. 3   On the one hand looms the grim reality 
of chronic mass 
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unemployment and the manifest incapacity of the formal sector of the economy to employ 
more than a small fraction of the growing number of work-seekers.  To some, the small and 
informal sectors offer the only hope of alleviating if not solving the problem, provided it is 
stimulated and freed from legislative restraint. 
Such a cure, argue critics of deregulation, might be worse than the disease.  Workers in 
small businesses tend to be paid lower wages, enjoy fewer rights and suffer worse 
conditions than workers in organized sectors.  Whittling away at their remaining rights 
would not only boost exploitation; it would undermine the conditions of labour in general. 4 
 
 
The Shaping of Government Policy 
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The government nailed its colours to the mast some seven years ago with the Temporary 
Removal of Restrictions on Economic Activities Act 87 of 1986 which gave sweeping powers 
to the State President to suspend any law which in his opinion 'unduly impedes economic 
development or competition in the economic field, or the creation of job opportunities'. 5   
In practice, these powers were only exercised in respect of a number of 'hives' (industrial 
parks) owned by the SBDC; and the Act itself is due to remain in force only until 31 March 
1994.  Nevertheless a precedent was created; and machinery was set in motion to extend 
such policies to the economy as a whole. 
The deregulation bandwagon was given further momentum by the idea of export-processing 
zones (EPZs) 6   mooted by the Department of Trade and Industry 'as part of a greater 
national plan to attract investments'. 7   Included among the inducements to investors 
would be exemption from tariffs, streamlining of administrative procedures, 'tax holidays' 
and, last but not least, 
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the possibility of excluding EPZs from 'host country legislation and policies such as minimum 
wages if necessary'. 8 
Finally, the National Manpower Commission (NMC) has embraced the principal assumption 
of the pro-deregulation lobby as a basis for future policy: 9 
 'Given the large potential contribution small businesses can make with regard to economic growth and the 
provision of employment in South Africa, the role of this sector cannot be ignored....  The stimulation of small 
formal and informal businesses in order for them to grow, to create more employment opportunities and wealth 
for the population of South Africa, is therefore very important.' 10 
This, however, is debatable.  There is considerable evidence that deregulation does not 
address the fundamental problems experienced by small entrepreneurs in the formal sector, 
let alone the de facto non-regulated informal sector. 11   The conclusion reached by Dewar, 
Postlethwayt & Watson in respect of the informal sector speaks volumes: 
 '[I]t is naive to assume that the informal sector can provide a solution to the problems of un- and 
underemployment on its own.  In reality, only a small minority of informal sector operations become 
successful, expanding operations.  The great majority face continuing poverty and economic and occupational 
insecurity.' 12 
Small businesses, it has been argued - 
 'are most likely to thrive on the basis of the increased aggregate demand for goods and services which is 
generated under conditions of general economic expansion.  We believe this is borne out by the experience of 
countries such as Japan which are cited as successful examples of policies for stimulating small businesses.  In 
the absence of powerful underlying growth, such stimulation can provide small businesses with a degree of 
protection against market forces but does not in itself lead to an increase of aggregate demand.  Essentially, it 
enables ... small businesses to preserve or increase their market share at the expense of non-subsidised 
businesses but does not create new space for economic growth'. 13 
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Beyond acknowledging that small businesses are in a 'difficult position vis-á-vis large 
businesses', however, the NMC has thus far seen no reason to temper its view.  Noting that 
'a balance between the interests of both employers and employees is still of the utmost 
importance', 14   it went on to recommend that 'all unnecessary restrictions [on small 
business growth] should be removed'. 15 





Criteria for Deregulation 
What will this mean for employees?  It will depend in the first place on the nature of the 
'restrictions' to be removed.  Regulations range from bureaucratic formalities to rules for 
enforcing basic worker rights, safety at work, minimum conditions of employment and other 
aspects of employee welfare.  Simplifying or abolishing red tape is no doubt a good thing.  
But what about regulations of the latter kind (referred to below as 'welfare regulations') and 
workers' rights in general? 
The problem is that small business is not a harmonious whole.  Like business in general it is 
characterized by tension between employers' interests and workers' interests.  While 
workers are the beneficiaries of welfare regulations, employers must bear the cost of 
complying with them.  Some conclude that, for this reason, welfare regulations are prime 
examples of 'restrictions' that need to be lifted for small businesses to grow; 16   the cost 
of complying with them is as much of a burden to struggling employers as the 
inconvenience of coping with red tape.  Interpreted thus, deregulation would take place at 
the direct expense of employees' rights and conditions of work; and this, notwithstanding its 
stated aim of seeking 'a balance between the interests of both employers and employees', is 
essentially the standpoint which the NMC has adopted. 
Its principal recommendation is that existing provision for exempting businesses from the 
operation of industrial council agreements should be 'made more accessible' to 
micro-businesses 17   and, moreover, 'supplemented by administrative and other relief 
which should be granted to micro-businesses automatically'. 18   In other words, exemption 
from statutory minimum 
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conditions as a remedy for the cost of complying with such conditions should be encouraged 
and extended, even if this means depriving employees of legal protection. 19 
Although the NMC report refers only to 'micro-businesses', it nevertheless represents a 
significant expansion of the frontiers of deregulation.  Firstly, it would mean that the 
principle of deregulation would for the first time be applied as of right to specified categories 
of business and no longer by dispensation.  Beyond this, market forces create a natural 
demand for deregulation, once implemented, to be extended to businesses not yet 
deregulated and rules not yet suspended.  Thus advocates of deregulation do not confine 
themselves to micro-businesses but plead the case for freeing the economy in general from 
regulatory restrictions. 20   Indeed, the Temporary Removal of Restrictions on Economic 
Activities Act was completely general in its permissive powers. 
If the policy recommended by the NMC were to be implemented, the number of exemptions 
would presumably rise significantly and 'free market' conditions could eventually become 
the norm in certain areas or sectors. 21   What this might lead to in a situation of mass 
unemployment was illustrated by a supermarket employee interviewed in Khayelitsha, near 
Cape Town, with whom 'conditions of employment were not even discussed ... let alone 
negotiated.  This worker had been taken on two weeks previously and did not know what 
his wages would be'. 22 





Dangers to Health and Safety 
In addition, the NMC recommended that micro-businesses should be exempt from 
regulations requiring sanitary conveniences, washing facilities, change rooms, rest and 
dining rooms and provision of seats. 23   It went on to state that 'consideration could also 
be given' to exempting such businesses from regulations relating to thermal requirements, 
lighting, windows, housekeeping, noise, precautions against flooding, fire precautions, 
supervision of machinery, reporting of incidents in 
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connection with machinery, notifiable substances and safety equipment 24   While no 
recommendation was made on these issues, the NMC was of the opinion that further 
investigation was needed to assess, not the efficacy of such regulations in protecting the 
health and welfare of employees, but their 'impact ... on micro-businesses'. 25 
As Barry Jammy observes, 'one might be forgiven for gaining the distinct impression ... that 
those rights [ie basic employee rights] were not foremost in the minds of the draftsmen 
when the report was prepared'. 26 
The prejudice threatened to workers by this approach is very real.  In a commentary 
submitted early on in the deliberations of the NMC, the Industrial Health Research Group 
(IHRG) at the University of Cape Town had presented evidence of hazards at work emerging 
from factory inspections and hygiene surveys, and concluded: 
 'Given that there are still serious problems for employees in factories as outlined above, we feel that the 
removal of MOSA 27   for small businesses will be a retrogressive step that will increase the already large 
burden to society of occupational disease and accidents.... 
 Small businesses have a tendency to employ largely casual labour, and there is seldom any provision for 
monitoring hazards and accidents, or a factory clinic.  They tend not to be organised by unions, and therefore 
there would be little protection for employees faced with unhealthy or dangerous deregulated conditions....  It 
is precisely in the small business sector where employees need legal protection because of their lack of union 
representation, and of an industrial relations framework for dealing with health and welfare questions.' 28 
Subsequent investigation lent weight to these concerns.  Surveys carried out at SBDC hives 
during 1991, while not conclusive, did reflect a higher degree of safety consciousness at 
regulated hives than at deregulated hives. 29   Follow-up interviews revealed a shrewd 
awareness among some employers of the possibility of cutting costs in the absence of (as 
the owner of a woodworking shop put it) 'fancy safety regulations'.  This, she explained, 
allowed her to run her business 'in a more practical way'. 30   All 
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four employees at this work-place, on the other hand, complained about dust, noise and 
cold.  One stated that she had required medical treatment for three months owing to chest 
problems caused by dust. 
Had the hive in question not been deregulated, these conditions would very possibly have 
been illegal. 





Towards an Alternative Policy 
Unfortunately, while the lifting of regulations legalizes abuses which would otherwise have 
been prohibited, it does not follow that the mere existence of regulations will prevent such 
abuses.  Various hazards are not covered by regulations; 31   in this sense there is a need 
for increased regulation rather than deregulation.  More problematically, health and safety 
inspectors are few in number and able to investigate only a small percentage of workplaces 
- in practice, high-risk work-places and those from which more compensation claims 
emanate.  A trade union presence is almost non-existent in small business and a strongly 
anti-union attitude is widespread among employers. 32   Thus there is nobody to monitor 
safety conditions, and regulations are frequently a dead letter. 
The same problem, it may be noted, would arise if conditions of employment in small 
businesses were to be regulated by means of a wage determination, as could be done at 
any time.  Again, as matters stand today, there would be little or no possibility of enforcing 
such a determination. 
To sum up: the welfare of employees in an extremely weak bargaining position will suffer if 
the thrust of state policy is to deprive them of legal protection; but legal protection in itself 
will be ineffectual in the absence of a mechanism to enforce it.  To address the totality of 
these problems, it is submitted, a twofold strategy is called for: 
(a) a system of collective bargaining appropriate to the small business sector needs to be 
developed as an alternative to the policy of deregulation; and 
(b) to make collective bargaining feasible and to monitor agreements, ways will need to 
be found of establishing a trade union presence in the sector. 
1993 ILJ p577 
 
 
A Collective Bargaining Model for Small Business 
A common objection to collective bargaining - and a principal argument for deregulation - is 
the belief that small business could not carry the increased labour costs which, it is 
assumed, would be imposed as a result.  In reality, the whole idea of collective bargaining 
is to reach agreement on working conditions and wages that both employers and workers 
can live with at that point in time.  This principle, enshrined in the LRA, applies to the small 
business sector as much as any other sector; the parties would set out to negotiate terms 
and conditions that employers could afford and that workers would regard as the best that 
are on offer. 
The real problem, therefore, is not collective bargaining per se but rather the fact that most 
employer organizations represented on most councils are dominated by major employers 
who are able to agree to terms that might be unaffordable to small and struggling 
enterprises.  An appropriate bargaining system would need to take account of actual 
differences among employers.  Within the industrial council context, it could give rise to 
sectoral agreements applicable exclusively to small businesses (as defined in the course of 
collective bargaining) in each industry, that would make fewer demands on employers and 
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contain fewer benefits for workers than the agreements applicable to the remainder of those 
industries. 33 
Dangers of abuse would no doubt be inherent in such a situation.  To limit such danger, two 
safeguards at least would be vital.  Firstly, the option of inclusion in the small business 
category for bargaining purposes should only be available to employers who would 
otherwise have qualified for exemption; it would, in other words, be an alternative to 
exemption rather than a new escape route from industrial council agreements.  Secondly, 
there would have to be a rigorous duty of disclosure on employers who seek to make use of 
this option to satisfy union parties that their case is genuine 34 
 
 
Developing a Bargaining System 
Trade union participation would be no less essential to collective bargaining in the small 
business sector than in any other sector. 35   Yet trade union organization in small 
businesses is at present extremely limited.  How can this problem be addressed? 
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A field study in the Cape Town area and the Kew industrial area in Johannesburg during the 
second half of 1991 suggested that the major obstacles to trade union organization were 
employer hostility and its mirror image: a perception among workers that unionization could 
jeopardize their jobs. 36   In addition, there was a noticeable reluctance among trade union 
officials to commit scarce resources to a sector that is perceived as being extremely difficult 
to organize. 37 
But the absence of representative trade unions is only one side of the problem.  Industrial 
councils are voluntary bodies and cannot function without employer participation.  With the 
exception of one or two industries, employer organization in the small business sector is as 
thin on the ground as union organization, and suspicion of industrial councils ranges from 
strong to intense.  The problem thus presents itself as follows: how would it be possible to 
persuade small employers to accept the freedom of their employees to join unions and, at 
the same time, to organize themselves for industrial council purposes? 
Very probably there is no simple answer.  A number of expedients, however, do present 
themselves.  On the one hand, a more concerted approach by the union movement at 
industry and national level could expand the frontiers of collective bargaining at least in 
certain areas of small business.  In addition to this, in the current climate of political 
renewal, union pressure combined with research into possible alternatives could influence 
emergent government policy towards the small business sector to open up new channels for 
collective bargaining. 
The need to encourage job creation is universally accepted; in this respect there are no 
fundamental differences between unions and employers. 38   In practice, this translates 
into pressure from the small business lobby or government to commit greater resources to 
assist small enterprises.  This, too, is not necessarily controversial.  The real question is 
the terms on which such assistance should be given. 
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From the free market point of view there should be a minimum of state intervention; in 
other words, subject only to questions of economic viability, assistance should have no 
strings attached.  Given the poor track record of small business in the area of worker 
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rights and the importance ascribed to this sector as an area of future job creation, such an 
approach can hardly be sound.  In return for the commitment of public resources, it is 
common practice to require compliance with the basic norms of public policy.  Public policy 
in a new South Africa, it is submitted, should include the promotion of trade union rights 
and collective bargaining in every sector of the economy, not excepting small business 
(which is, indeed, the stated objective of the existing LRA).  Benefits such as tax relief, low 
interest loans, access to state contracts and assistance in general should be made 
conditional not only on economic considerations but also on compliance with a minimum 
code of conduct which should include (a) union recognition and (b) industrial council 
representation for the purposes of negotiating collective agreements applicable to the small 
business sector. 39 
Would this impose a straitjacket on small employers?  It is submitted that it would not.  
Employers would be given the choice whether to take on certain social responsibilities in 
return for certain privileges.  The point, surely, is that society may reserve the right to 
encourage those forms of endeavour which are in accordance with its overall objectives and 
to refrain from rewarding activities which undermine them. 
From a comparative point of view it is interesting to note the provision made in the Bank of 
Zambia Act 24 of 1985 for guarantees by the central bank to 'needy small scale or new 
entrepreneurs who could not induce independent sureties or securities' with the aim of 
'increasing the flow of institutional credit to small-scale enterprises'. 40   For a number of 
reasons the scheme failed to take off and, in Ailola's view, the guarantee mechanism is 
badly suited to promote lending to 'sectors that are largely informal and which lack the 
basic assets to cushion the borrower in the event of default'. 41   Nevertheless, an 
interesting feature of the scheme was the requirement to register the business in question 
with the Small Industries Development Organisation or the Village Industry Service in order 
to qualify for a guarantee. 42   Although this may well have been 'unnecessary and 
bureaucratic' 43   in the Zambian context, it does illustrate the possibility of requiring small 
business to comply with a broader social policy in return for state assistance. 
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A different avenue of promoting a union culture in small business, with interesting 
implications, was the practice of some major unions in the USA in the 1930's of providing 
loans and management counselling to small employers on the verge of bankruptcy.  
Blumrosen comments: 'When benefits come from the union, employee loyalty increases as 
does employer cooperation. 44 
 
 
Developing Union Structures 
If policies of this nature were to be followed, union membership in the small business sector 
would be likely to increase and collective bargaining along the lines suggested above might 
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well become technically possible.  The problem of effective union organization, however, to 
give body to collective bargaining and monitor the implementation of agreements, would 
remain. 
This question, though of a practical rather than a legal nature, is crucial to the propositions 
raised above.  Even before delving into the rich field of comparative international 
experience, there have been some innovative efforts at organizing workers in small 
businesses by a number of South African unions - in particular, attempting to establish 
area-based rather than work-place-based units of organization. 45   Not only does this 
grapple with the very real difficulty of servicing small numbers of members scattered across 
large numbers of work-places; it opens up possibilities of developing inter-union 
co-operation along the lines of COSATU locals. 46   Shop stewards elected by the combined 
membership of the different unions in the area could serve as a first-line union structure in 
dealing with local work-place problems and negotiations.  Although steps in this direction 
have so far been only tentative, a more concerted union intervention focused around the 
development of collective bargaining structures could give considerable impetus to 
organization on the ground. 
Organization of this nature would embody a more direct or participatory form of democracy 
than the representative model which is typical of unionism in large enterprises and industrial 
councils.  The membership would of necessity be the union to a greater extent than in 
large-scale industry where full-time organizers can play a bigger role.  Moreover, in the 
small business context, the duty of disclosure which is inherent in collective bargaining 
could well give rise to de facto worker participation.  With employers and employees often 
working shoulder to shoulder, the logic of the situation might be to give the latter increasing 
influence over and involvement in management 
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decisions to the point, in some cases, of co-managing the business.  This, in turn, could 
help to supplement the scarcity of management skills which is one of the most serious 
constraints on small business development. 47 
 
 
Creating New Traditions 
It is not suggested that any of the expedients discussed above will be a panacea for the 
problems that have been identified.  At best there will be a protracted process of battling 
on different fronts to establish new traditions in the face of resistance, prejudice, suspicion 
and fear of the unknown among workers as well as employers.  A successful precedent, 
however, could serve as a beachhead of labour culture more in keeping with the values of a 
new South Africa.  Step by step the prevailing climate could be changed to a stage where, 
at least in certain areas of small business, organization and collective bargaining would be 
seen as symbols of progress rather than tentacles of strangulation. 
Such a process would clearly be of more than industrial significance.  Problems of social 
upliftment and empowerment of an oppressed population are centrally on today's agenda.  
Involving the most disadvantaged and marginalized workers in the organization of their 
working lives would ipso facto broaden their horizons, boost their self-confidence and draw 
them more fully into the mainstream of social transformation. 
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Repeated predictions by economists of the increasing proportion of work-seekers who will 
be forced to seek employment in small and informal businesses lend force to this 
conclusion.  Society will be the poorer if these hundreds of thousands of people were to be 
abandoned to the forces of a deregulated market.  Society will benefit if their energies and 
skills can be linked to those of the labour movement as a whole.  Creating a legislative 
framework to make this possible should be one of the priorities of South Africa's first 
democratically elected government. 
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